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I. Introduction
The project.—Redistribution of wealth is a central issue in the discussion
of economic policy. It is also one of the arguments most frequently used
to justify the intervention of the government. In spite of its importance,
formal attempts to evaluate the distributional implications of policy have
had little success. The main reason is that researchers have failed to
come up with a quantitative theory that accounts for the observed earn-
ings and wealth inequality in sufficient detail. The purpose of this article
is to provide such a theory.
The facts.—In the U.S. economy, the distributions of earnings and,
especially, of wealth are very concentrated and skewed to the right. For
instance, their Gini indexes are 0.63 and 0.78, respectively, and the
shares of earnings and wealth of the households in the top 1 percent
of the corresponding distributions are 15 percent and 30 percent,
respectively.1
The question.—In this article we ask whether we can construct a theory
of earnings and wealth inequality, based on the optimal choices of ex
ante identical households that face uninsured idiosyncratic shocks to
their endowments of efficiency labor units, that accounts for the U.S.
distributions of earnings and wealth. We find that we can.
Previous answers.—Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull (1997) review the quanti-
tative attempts to account for earnings and wealth inequality until that
date, and they show that every article that studies the decisions of house-
holds with identical preferences has serious problems in accounting for
the shares of earnings and of wealth of the households in both tails of
the corresponding distributions. Later work suffers from milder versions
of the same problems: it fails to account both for the extremely long
and thin top tails of the distributions and for the large number of
households in their bottom tails. These results lead us to conclude that
a quantitative theory of earnings and wealth inequality that can be used
to evaluate the distributional implications of economic policy is still in
the works.
This article.—Our theory of earnings and wealth inequality is based
on the optimal choices of households with identical and standard pref-
erences. These households receive an idiosyncratic random endowment
of efficiency labor units, they do not have access to insurance markets,
and they save, in part, to smooth their consumption. In relation to
1 These facts and the points of the Lorenz curves of earnings and wealth reported in
table 2 below have been obtained using data from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). They are reported in Dı´az-Gime´nez, Quadrini, and Rı´os-Rull (1997), and they are
confirmed by many other empirical studies (see, e.g., Lillard and Willis 1978; Wolff 1987;
Hurst, Luoh, and Stafford 1998).
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previous work, we make three major changes to the way in which this
basic theory is implemented. These changes pertain to the design of
our model economy and to our calibration procedure: (i) We mix the
main features of the dynastic and of the life cycle abstractions. More
specifically, we assume that the households in our model economies are
altruistic and that they go through the life cycle stages of working age
and retirement. These features give our households two additional rea-
sons to save: to supplement their retirement pensions and to endow
their estates. They also help us to account for the top tail of the wealth
distribution. (ii) We model explicitly some of the quantitative properties
of the U.S. Social Security system. This feature gives our earnings-poor
households few incentives to save. It also helps us to account for the
bottom tail of the wealth distribution. (iii) We calibrate our model econ-
omy to the Lorenz curves of U.S. earnings and wealth as reported by
the 1992 SCF. We do this instead of measuring the process on earnings
directly, as is standard in the literature. This feature allows us to obtain
a process on earnings that is consistent with both the aggregate and the
distributional data on earnings and wealth. It also enables the earnings-
rich households in our model economy to accumulate sufficiently large
amounts of wealth sufficiently fast.
Two additional features that distinguish our model economy from
those in the literature are as follows: (iv) We model the labor decision
explicitly, and (v) we replicate the progressivity of the U.S. income and
estate tax systems. The first of these two features is important because
the ultimate goal of our study of inequality is to evaluate the distribu-
tional implications of fiscal policy, and doing this in models that do not
study the labor decision explicitly makes virtually no sense. The second
feature is important because progressive income and estate taxation
distorts the labor and savings decisions, discouraging earnings-rich
households both from working long hours and from accumulating large
quantities of wealth. Therefore, the fact that we succeed in accounting
for the observed earnings and wealth inequality, in spite of the disin-
centives created by progressive taxation, increases our confidence in the
usefulness of our theory.
In the last part of this article, we use our model economy to study
the roles played by the life cycle profile of earnings and by the inter-
generational transmission of earnings ability in accounting for earnings
and wealth inequality, and finally, we use it to quantify the steady-state
implications of abolishing estate taxation.
Findings.—We show that our model economy can be calibrated to the
main U.S. macroeconomic aggregates, to the U.S. progressive income
and estate tax systems, and to the Lorenz curves of both earnings and
wealth, and we find that there is a four-state Markov process on the
endowment of efficiency labor units that accounts for the U.S. distri-
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butions of earnings and wealth almost exactly. This process on the earn-
ings potential of households is persistent, and the differences in the
values of its realizations are large.2
As an additional test of our theory, we compare its predictions with
respect to two sets of overidentifying restrictions: the earnings and
wealth mobility of U.S. households and the U.S. distribution of con-
sumption. With respect to mobility, we find that our model economy
accounts for some of its qualitative features but that, quantitatively, our
model economies’ mobility statistics differ from their U.S. counterparts.
With respect to the distribution of consumption, we find that our model
economy does a good job of accounting for the quantitative properties
of the U.S. distribution of this variable.
We also find that, even though the roles played by the intergenera-
tional transmission of earnings ability and the life cycle profile of earn-
ings are quantitatively significant, they are not crucial to accounting for
the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality.
Finally, as far as the policy experiment of abolishing estate taxation
is concerned, we find that the steady-state implications of this policy
change are to increase output by 0.35 percent and the stock of capital
by 0.87 percent, and that its distributional implications are very small.
Sectioning.—The rest of the article is organized as follows: In Section
II, we summarize some of the previous attempts to account for earnings
and wealth inequality, and we justify our modeling choices. In Section
III, we describe our benchmark model economy. In Section IV, we dis-
cuss our calibration strategy. In Section V, we report our findings, and
we quantify the roles played by the intergenerational transmission of
earnings ability and the life cycle profile of earnings in accounting for
inequality. In Section VI, we evaluate the steady-state implications of
abolishing estate taxation, and in Section VII, we offer some concluding
comments.
II. Previous Literature and the Rationale for Our Modeling
Choices
In this section we summarize the findings of Aiyagari (1994), Huggett
(1996), Quadrini (1997), Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and Rı´os-Rull
(1998a), Krusell and Smith (1998), De Nardi (1999), and Domeij and
Klein (2000).3 Those articles share the following features: (i) they at-
tempt to account for the earnings and wealth inequality; (ii) they study
2 These two properties are features of the shocks faced by young households when they
enter the labor market. This result suggests that the circumstances of people’s youth play
a significant role in determining their economic status as adults.
3 For a detailed discussion of the contributions made in the first four of these articles,
see Quadrini and Rı´os-Rull (1997).
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TABLE 1
Distributions of Earnings and of Wealth in the United States and in
Selected Model Economies
Gini Bottom 40% Top 5% Top 1%
A. U.S. Economy
Earnings .63 3.2 31.2 14.8
Wealth .78 1.7 54.0 29.6
B. Aiyagari (1994)
Earnings .10 32.5 7.5 6.8
Wealth .38 14.9 13.1 3.2
C. Castan˜eda et al. (1998)
Earnings .30 20.6 10.1 2.0
Wealth .13 32.0 7.9 1.7
D. Quadrini (1998)
Earnings … … … …
Wealth .74 … 45.8 24.9
E. Krusell and Smith (1998)
Earnings … … … …
Wealth .82 … 55.0 24.0
F. Huggett (1996)
Earnings .42 9.8 22.6 13.6
Wealth .74 .0 33.8 11.1
G. De Nardi (1999)
Earnings … … … …
Wealth .61 1.0 38.0 15.0
the decisions of households that face a process on labor earnings that
is random, household-specific, and noninsurable; and (iii) the house-
holds in their model economies accumulate wealth in part to smooth
their consumption. We report some of their quantitative findings in
table 1.
Aiyagari (1994), Quadrini (1997), Castan˜eda et al. (1998a), and Kru-
sell and Smith (1998) model purely dynastic households. Aiyagari mea-
sures the process on earnings using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID) and other sources, and he obtains distributions of earnings and
wealth that are too disperse (see panel B of table 1). Castan˜eda et al.
partition the population into five household types that are subject to
type-specific employment processes, and they find that permanent earn-
ings differences play a very small role in accounting for wealth inequality.
Quadrini explores the role played by entrepreneurship in accounting
for wealth inequality and economic mobility, and he finds that this role
is key. His model economy does not account for the earnings and wealth
distributions completely, but it accounts for the fact that the wealth to
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income ratios of entrepreneurs are significantly higher than those of
workers. Finally, Krusell and Smith use shocks to the time discount rates
in their attempt to account for the observed wealth inequality. This
feature distinguishes their work from the rest of the articles discussed
in this section—which study the decisions of households with identical
preferences—and it allows Krusell and Smith to do a fairly good job of
accounting for the Gini index and for the share of wealth owned by
the households in the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution (see
panel E of table 1).
Huggett (1996) studies a purely life cycle model. He calibrates the
process on earnings using different secondary sources, and he includes
a social security system that pays a lump-sum pension to retirees. The
Gini indexes of the distributions of earnings and wealth of his model
economy are higher than those in most of the other articles discussed
in this section, partly because of the very large number of households
with negative wealth. Moreover, he also falls short of accounting for the
share of wealth owned by the households in the top 5 percent of the
wealth distribution (see panel F of table 1).
In a recent working paper, De Nardi (1999) studies a life cycle model
economy with intergenerational transmission of genes and joy-of-giving
bequests. This is a somewhat ad hoc way of modeling altruism, and it
makes her results difficult to evaluate. It is hard to tell how much joy
of giving is appropriate, and it is not clear whether her parameterization
implies that her agents care more, less, or the same for their children
than for themselves. With the significant exception of the top 1 percent
of the wealth distribution, she comes reasonably close to accounting for
the wealth inequality observed in the United States (see panel G of table
1).
Finally, in a very recent working paper, Domeij and Klein (2000) study
an overlapping generations model without leisure that follows people
well into their old age. They find that a generous pension scheme is
essential to accounting for distributions of wealth that are significantly
concentrated.4 In accordance with Huggett (1996) and the pure life
cycle tradition, Domeij and Klein also find that the share of wealth
owned by the very wealthy households in their model economy is much
smaller than in the data. The reason is that in model economies that
abstract from altruism, the old do not have enough reasons to save, and
consequently, they end up consuming most of their wealth before they
die.
4 In contrast to the rest of the papers discussed in this section, Domeij and Klein attempt
to account for income and wealth inequality in Sweden. Even though the earnings and
wealth inequality is smaller in Sweden than in the United States, the distributions of income
and wealth in Sweden, like their U.S. counterparts, are significantly concentrated and
skewed to the right.
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This brief literature review shows that both purely dynastic and purely
life cycle model economies fail to generate enough savings to account
for wealth inequality. In purely dynastic models the main reason is that
the wealth to earnings ratios of the earnings-rich are too low, and those
of the earnings-poor are too high. In purely life cycle models the main
reason is that households have neither the incentives nor the time to
accumulate sufficiently large amounts of wealth. To overcome these
problems, the model economy that we study in this article includes the
main features of both abstractions—namely, retirement and bequests.
Our review of the literature also shows that theories that abstract from
social security result in wealth to earnings ratios of the households in
the bottom tails of the distributions that are too high. To overcome this
problem, our model economy includes an explicit pension system that
reduces the life cycle savings of the earnings-poorest.
Another important conclusion that arises from our review of the lit-
erature is that attempts to measure the process on earnings directly,
using sources that do not oversample the rich and are subject to a
significant amount of top-coding, misrepresent the income of the high-
est earners and fail to deliver the U.S. distribution of earnings as mea-
sured by the SCF. Since, in those theories, the earnings of highly pro-
ductive households are much too small, it is hardly surprising that the
earnings-rich households of their model economies fail to accumulate
enough wealth. To overcome this problem, in this article we use the
Lorenz curves of both earnings and wealth to calibrate the process on
the endowment of efficiency labor units faced by our model economy
households. We find that this procedure allows us to account for the
U.S. distributions of earnings and wealth almost exactly.
Finally, in a previous version of this article (see Castan˜eda et al. 1998b),
we found that progressive income taxation plays an important role in
accounting for the observed earnings and wealth inequality. Specifically,
in that article we study two calibrated model economies that differ only
in the progressivity of their income tax rates—in one of them they
reproduce the progressivity of U.S. effective rates, and in the other one
they are constant—and we find that their distributions of wealth differ
significantly.5 We concluded that theories that abstract from the labor
decision and from progressive income taxation make it significantly
easier for earnings-rich households to accumulate large quantities of
wealth. The reason is that in those model economies, both the after-
tax wage and the after-tax rate of return are significantly larger than
those observed, and this disparity exaggerates their ability to account
5 For example, the steady-state share of wealth owned by the households in the top 1
percent of the wealth distribution increases from 29.5 percent to 39.0 percent, the share
owned by those in the bottom 60 percent decreases from 3.8 percent to 0.1 percent, and
the Gini index increases from 0.79 to a startling 0.87.
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for the observed wealth inequality. To overcome this problem, in our
model economy, the labor decision is endogenous, and we include ex-
plicit income and estate tax systems that replicate the progressivities of
their U.S. counterparts.
In summary, our literature review leads us to conclude that previous
attempts to account for the observed earnings and wealth inequality
have failed to provide us with a theory in which households have iden-
tical and standard preferences, in which the earnings process is consis-
tent both with the U.S. aggregate earnings and with the U.S. earnings
distribution, and in which the tax system resembles the U.S. tax system.
In this article we provide such a theory.
III. The Model Economy
The model economy analyzed in this article is a modified version of the
stochastic neoclassical growth model with uninsured idiosyncratic risk
and no aggregate uncertainty. The key features of our model economy
are as follows: (i) it includes a large number of households with identical
preferences; (ii) households face an uninsured, household-specific
shock to their endowments of efficiency labor units; (iii) households
go through the life cycle stages of working age and retirement; (iv)
retired households face a positive probability of dying, and when they
die, they are replaced by a working-age descendant; and (v) households
are altruistic toward their descendants.
A. The Private Sector
1. Population Dynamics and Information
We assume that our model economy is inhabited by a continuum of
households. The households either can be of working age or can be
retired. Working-age households face an uninsured idiosyncratic sto-
chastic process that determines the value of their endowment of effi-
ciency labor units. They also face an exogenous and positive probability
of retiring. Retired households are endowed with zero efficiency labor
units. They also face an exogenous and positive probability of dying.
When a retired household dies, it is replaced by a working-age descen-
dant that inherits the deceased household estate, if any, and, possibly,
some of its earning abilities. We use the one-dimensional shock, s, to
denote the household’s random age and random endowment of effi-
ciency labor units jointly (for details on this process, see Secs. IIIA2 and
IVA2 below). We assume that this process is independent and identically
distributed across households and that it follows a finite state Markov
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chain with conditional transition probabilities given by ′G p G(s Fs)pSS
where s and′ ′Pr {s p s Fs p s}, s  Sp {1, 2, … , n }.t1 t s
2. Employment Opportunities
We assume that every household is endowed with  units of disposable
time and that the joint age and endowment shock s takes values in one
of two possible J-dimensional sets, s  Sp E ∪ Rp {1, 2, … , J } ∪ { J
When a household draws shock we say that it is1, J 2, … , 2J }. s  E,
of working age, and we assume that it is endowed with efficiencye(s) 1 0
labor units. When a household draws shock we say that it iss  R ,
retired, and we assume that it is endowed with zero efficiency labor
units. We use the to keep track of the realization of s that thes  R
household faced during the last period of its working life. This knowl-
edge is essential to analyze the role played by the intergenerational
transmission of earnings ability in this class of economies.
The notation described above allows us to represent every demo-
graphic change in our model economy as a transition between the sets
E and R. When a household’s shock changes from to we′s  E s  R ,
say that it has retired. When it changes from to we say that′s  R s  E,
it has died and has been replaced by a working-age descendant. More-
over, this specification of the joint age and endowment process implies
that the transition probability matrix controls (i) the demographicsGSS
of the model economy by determining the expected durations of the
households’ working lives and retirements, (ii) the lifetime persistence
of earnings by determining the mobility of households between the
states in E, (iii) the life cycle pattern of earnings by determining how
the endowments of efficiency labor units of new entrants differ from
those of senior working-age households, and (iv) the intergenerational
persistence of earnings by determining the correlation between the
states in E for consecutive members of the same dynasty. In Section IVA2
we discuss these issues in detail.
3. Preferences
We assume that households value both their consumption and their
leisure and that they care about the utility of their descendants as much
as they care about their own utility. Consequently, the households’ pref-
erences can be described by the following standard expected utility
function:

tE bu(c ,  l )Fs , (1) t t 0[ ]
tp0
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where the function u is continuous and strictly concave in both argu-
ments, is the time discount factor, is consumption,  is0 ! b ! 1 c ≥ 0t
the endowment of productive time, and is labor. Consequently,0 ≤ l ≤ t
is the amount of time that the households allocate to nonmarket l t
activities.
4. Production Possibilities
We assume that aggregate output, depends on aggregate capital,Y ,t
and on the aggregate labor input, through a constant returns toK , L ,t t
scale aggregate production function, Aggregate capital isY p f(K , L ).t t t
obtained aggregating the wealth of every household, and the aggregate
labor input is obtained aggregating the efficiency labor units supplied
by every household. We assume that capital depreciates geometrically
at a constant rate, d.
5. Transmission and Liquidation of Wealth
We assume that every household inherits the estate of the previous
member of its dynasty at the beginning of the first period of its working
life. Specifically, we assume that when a retired household dies, it does
so after that period’s consumption and savings have taken place. At the
beginning of the following period, the deceased household’s estate is
liquidated, and the household’s descendant inherits a fraction 1
of this estate. The rest of the estate is instantaneously and costlesslyt (z )E t
transformed into the current-period consumption good, and it is taxed
away by the government. Note that the variable denotes the value ofz t
the household’s stock of wealth at the end of period t.
B. The Government Sector
We assume that the government in our model economies taxes house-
holds’ income and estates and that it uses the proceeds of taxation to
make real transfers to retired households and to finance its consump-
tion. Income taxes are described by the function where denotest(y ), yt t
household income; estate taxes are described by the function ; andt (z )E t
public transfers are described by the function Therefore, in ourq(s ).t
model economies, a government policy rule is a specification of {t(y ),t
and of a process on government consumption, Sincet (z ), q(s )} {G }.E t t t
we also assume that the government must balance its budget every pe-
riod, these policies must satisfy the following restriction:
G  Tr p T , (2)t t t
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where and denote aggregate transfers and aggregate tax revenues,Tr Tt t
respectively.6
C. Market Arrangements
We assume that there are no insurance markets for the household-
specific shock.7 Moreover, we also assume that the households in our
model economy cannot borrow.8 Partly to buffer their streams of con-
sumption against the shocks, households can accumulate wealth in the
form of real capital, at. We assume that these wealth holdings belong
to a compact set A. The lower bound of this set can be interpreted as
a form of liquidity constraints or, alternatively, as the solvency require-
ment mentioned above. The existence of an upper bound for the asset
holdings is guaranteed as long as the after-tax rate of return to savings
is smaller than the households’ common rate of time preference (see
Huggett [1993], Aiyagari [1994], and Rı´os-Rull [1999] for details). This
condition is satisfied in every model economy that we study. Finally, we
assume that firms rent factors of production from households in com-
petitive spot markets. This assumption implies that factor prices are
given by the corresponding marginal productivities.
D. Equilibrium
Each period the economywide state is a measure of households, xt,
defined over B, an appropriate family of subsets of As far as{S#A }.
each individual household is concerned, the state variables are the re-
alization of the household-specific shock, st, its stock of wealth, at, and
the aggregate state variable, xt. However, for the purposes of this article,
6 Note that social security in our model economy takes the form of transfers to retired
households and that these transfers do not depend on past contributions made by the
households. We make this assumption in part for technical reasons. Discriminatingbetween
the households according to their past contributions to a social security system requires
the inclusion of a second asset-type state variable in the household decision problem, and
this increases the computational costs significantly.
7 This is a key feature of this class of model worlds. When insurance markets are allowed
to operate, our model economies collapse to a standard representative household model,
as long as the right initial conditions hold. In a recent article, Cole and Kocherlakota
(1997) study economies of this type with the additional characteristic that private storage
is unobservable. They conclude that the best achievable allocation is the equilibrium
allocation that obtains when households have access to the market structure assumed in
this article. We interpret this finding to imply that the market structure that we use here
could arise endogenously from certain unobservability features of the environment—
specifically, from the unobservability of both the realization of the shock and the amount
of wealth.
8 Given that leisure is an argument in the households’ utility function, this borrowing
constraint can be interpreted as a solvency constraint that prevents the households from
going bankrupt in every state of the world.
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it suffices to consider only the steady states of the market structure
described above. These steady states have the property that the measure
of households remains invariant, even though both the state variables
and the actions of the individual households change from one period
to the next. This implies that, in a steady state, the individual house-
holds’ state variable is simply the pair Since the structure of the(s , a ).t t
households’ problem is recursive, henceforth we drop the time subscript
from all the current-period variables, and we use primes to denote the
values of variables one period ahead.
1. The Households’ Decision Problem
The dynamic program solved by a household whose state is (s, a) is
′ ′v(s, a)p max u(c,  l) b G v[s , a (z)] (3)′ ss{ }′s Sc≥0,zA,0≤l≤
subject to c zp y t(y) a, (4)
yp ar e(s)lw q(s), (5)
′z t (z) if s  R and s  E′ Ea (z)p (6){z otherwise,
where v denotes the households’ value function, r denotes the rental
price of capital, and w denotes the wage rate. Note that the definition
of income, y, includes three terms: capital income, which can be earned
by every household; labor income, which can be earned only by working-
age households (recall that when ); and social securitye(s)p 0 s  R
income, which can be earned only by retired households (recall that
when ). The household policy that solves this problem isq(s)p 0 s  E
a set of functions that map the individual state into choices for con-
sumption, gross savings, and hours worked. We denote this policy by
{c(s, a), z(s, a), l(s, a)}.
2. Definition of Equilibrium
A steady-state equilibrium for this economy is a household value func-
tion, ; a household policy, ; a governmentv(s, a) {c(s, a), z(s, a), l(s, a)}
policy, ; a stationary probability measure of house-{t(y), t (z), q(s), G }E
holds, x; factor prices, ; and macroeconomic aggregates, {K, L, T,(r, w)
Tr }, such that the following conditions hold: (i) Factor inputs, tax rev-
enues, and transfers are obtained aggregating over households:
Kp adx, (7)
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Lp l(s, a)e(s)dx, (8)
Tp t(y)dx y g t (z)z(s, a)dx, (9)  sR sE E
Trp q(s)dx, (10)
where household income, is defined in equation (5); y denotesy(s, a),
the indicator function; ; and, consequently, is theg {  G y g′′sE s,s sR sEs E
probability that a type s household dies; recall that this probability is
zero when since we have assumed that working-age householdss  E,
do not die. All integrals are defined over the state space S#A. (ii)
Given x, K, L, r, and w, the household policy solves the households’
decision problem described in (3), and factor prices are factor marginal
productivities:
rp f (K, L) d, wp f (K, L). (11)1 2
(iii) The goods market clears:
[c(s, a) z(s, a)]dx Gp f(K, L) (1 d)K. (12)
(iv) The government budget constraint is satisfied:
G Trp T. (13)
(v) The measure of households is stationary:
′x(B)p {y y  y y }G dx dzds (14)′ ′ ′  z(s,a) sR∨s E [1t (z)]z(s,a) sR∧s E s,sE( )
B S,A
for all where ∨ and ∧ are the logical operators “or” and “and.”B  B,
Equation (14) counts the households, and the cumbersome indicator
functions and logical operators are used to account for estate taxation.
We describe the procedure that we use to compute this equilibrium in
Section B of the Appendix.
IV. Calibration
In this article, we use the following calibration strategy: (i) we target
key ratios of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts, some
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TABLE 2
Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the U.S. Economy (%)
Gini
Quintile Top Groups (Percentile)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 90th–95th 95th–99th 99th–100th
A. Distribution of Earnings
.63 .40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76
B. Distribution of Wealth
.78 .39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55
features of the current U.S. income and estate tax systems, some de-
scriptive statistics of U.S. demographics, and some features of the life
cycle profile and of the intergenerational persistence of U.S labor earn-
ings;9 and (ii) we also target the Lorenz curves of the U.S. distributions
of earnings and wealth reported in table 2. This last feature is a crucial
step in our calibration strategy, and we feel that it should be discussed
in some detail.
Recall that, in Section II, we highlighted that the literature tradition-
ally models the process on earnings using direct measurements from
some source of earnings data, such as the PSID, the Current Population
Survey, or even the Consumer Expenditure Survey. However, all these
data sources suffer from two important shortcomings: unlike the SCF,
they are not specifically concerned with obtaining a careful measure-
ment of the earnings of the households in the top tail of the earnings
distribution, and they use a significant amount of top-coding—a pro-
cedure that groups every household whose earnings are above a certain
level in the last interval.
These important shortcomings have the following implications: (i)
the measures of aggregate earnings obtained using those databases are
inconsistent with the measures obtained from National Income and
Product Accounts data, and (ii) the distributions of earnings generated
by those processes are significantly less concentrated than the distri-
bution of U.S. earnings obtained from SCF data; to verify this fact, simply
compare the U.S. distribution of earnings with the distributions of earn-
ings of the model economies reported in table 1.10 Furthermore, the
9 Note that throughout this article our definition of earnings both for the United States
and for the model economies includes only before-tax labor income. Consequently, it
does not include either capital income or government transfers. The sources for the data
and the definitions of all the distributional variables used in this article can be found in
Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (1997).
10 Note that the distributions of earnings summarized in table 1 have been generated
using processes that match the main features of data sources other than the SCF.
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methods used to estimate the persistence of earnings using direct data
are somewhat controversial.11
To get around these problems, instead of using direct estimates from
earnings data, we use our own model economy to obtain a process on
the endowment of efficiency labor units that delivers the U.S. distri-
butions of earnings and wealth as measured by the SCF. As we discuss
in detail below, our calibration procedure uses the Gini indexes and a
small number of points of the Lorenz curves of both earnings and wealth
as part of our calibration targets. This calibration procedure amounts
to searching for a parsimonious process on the endowment of efficiency
labor units, which, together with the remaining features of our model
economy, allows us to account for the earnings and wealth inequality
and for the rest of our calibration targets simultaneously.
In the subsections that follow, we discuss our choices for the model
economy’s functional forms and identify their parameters, we describe
our calibration targets, and we describe the computational procedure
that allows us to choose the values of those parameters. We report the
parameter values in table 3 and in table 4 and in the first row of table
5 below.
A. Functional Forms and Parameters
1. Preferences
Our choice for the households’ common utility function is12
1j 1j1 2c ( l)
u(c, l)p  x . (15)
1 j 1 j1 2
We make this choice because the households in our model economies
face very large changes in productivity, which, under standard nonsep-
arable preferences, would result in extremely large variations in hours
worked. To avoid this, we chose a more flexible functional that is ad-
ditively separable in consumption and leisure and that allows for dif-
ferent curvatures on these two variables. Our choice for the utility func-
tion implies that, to characterize the households’ preferences, we must
choose the values of five parameters: the four that identify the utility
function and the time discount factor, b.
11 See Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) for a discussion of this issue.
12 Note that we have assumed that retired households do not work, and consequently,
the second term in expression (15) becomes an irrelevant constant for these households.
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TABLE 3
Parameter Values for the Benchmark Model Economy
Parameter Value
Preferences:
Time discount factor b .924
Curvature of consumption j1 1.500
Curvature of leisure j2 1.016
Relative share of consumption and
leisure x 1.138
Productive time  3.200
Age and employment process:
Common probability of retiring p e .022
Common probability of dying 1 p .066
Earnings life cycle controller f1 .969
Intergenerational earnings persistence
controller f2 .525
Technology:
Capital share v .376
Capital depreciation rate d .059
Government policy:
Government expenditures G .296
Normalized transfers to retirees q .696
Income tax function parameters a0 .258
a1 .768
a2 .491
a3 .144
Estate tax function parameters:
Tax-exempt level z 14.101
Marginal tax rate tE .160
2. The Joint Age and Endowment of Efficiency Labor Units Process
In Section III, we assumed that the joint age and endowment of effi-
ciency labor units process takes values in set where E andSp {E ∪ R },
R are two J-dimensional sets. Consequently, the number of realizations
of this process is 2J. Therefore, to specify this process we must choose
a total of parameters. Of these parameters, cor-2 2 2(2J )  J (2J )  J (2J )
respond to the transition probability matrix on s, and the remaining J
parameters correspond to the endowments of efficiency labor units,
e(s).13
However, our assumptions about the nature of the joint age and en-
dowment process impose some additional structure on the transition
probability matrix, To understand this feature of our model economyG .SS
better, it helps to consider the following partition of this matrix:
G GEE ERG p . (16)SS [ ]G GRE RR
In expression (16), submatrix describes the changes in the en-GEE
13 Recall that we have assumed that for alle(s)p 0 s  R.
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dowments of efficiency labor units of working-age households that are
still of working age one period later; submatrix describes the tran-GER
sitions from the working-age states into the retirement states; submatrix
describes the transitions from the retirement states into the working-GRE
age states that take place when a retired household dies and is replaced
by its working-age descendant; and, finally, submatrix describes theGRR
changes in the retirement states of retired households that are still
retired one period later. In the paragraphs that follow, we describe our
assumptions with respect to these four submatrices.
First, to determine we must choose the values of parameters.2G , JEE
The reason is that we impose no restrictions on the transitions between
the working-age states. Next, where is the probability ofG p p I, p ER e e
retiring, and I is the identity matrix. The reason is that we use only the
last working-age shock to keep track of the earnings ability of retired
households, and we assume that every working-age household faces the
same probability of retiring. Consequently, to determine we mustG ,ER
choose the value of one parameter. Next, where isG p p I, 1 p RR
the probability of dying. The reason is that the type of retired households
never changes, and we assume that every retired household faces the
same probability of dying. Consequently, to determine we mustG ,RR
choose the value of one additional parameter. Finally, our assumptions
with respect to are dictated by one of the secondary purposes of thisGRE
article, which is to evaluate the roles played by the life cycle profile of
earnings and by the intergenerational transmission of earnings ability
in accounting for earnings and wealth inequality. It turns out that these
two roles can be modeled very parsimoniously using only two additional
parameters.
To do this, we use the following procedure: first, to determine the
intergenerational persistence of earnings, we must choose the distri-
bution from which the households draw the first shock of their working
lives. If we assume that the households draw this shock from the sta-
tionary distribution of which we denote then the intergen-∗s  E, g ,E
erational correlation of earnings will be very small. In contrast, if we
assume that every working-age household inherits the endowment of
efficiency labor units that its predecessor had at retirement, then the
intergenerational correlation of earnings will be relatively large. Since
the value that we target for this correlation, which is .4, lies between
these two extremes, we need one additional parameter, which we denote
to act as a weight that averages between a matrix with in every∗f , g1 E
row, which we denote and the identity matrix. Intuitively, the role∗G ,RE
played by this parameter is to shift the probability mass of toward∗GRE
its diagonal.
Second, to measure the life cycle profile of earnings, we target the
ratio of the average earnings of households between ages 60 and 41 to
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that of households between ages 40 and 21. The value of this statistic
in our model economies is determined by the differences in earnings
ability of new workforce entrants and senior workers. If we assume that
every household starts its working life with a shock drawn from then∗g ,E
household earnings will be essentially independent of household age—
except for the different wealth effects that result from the household-
specific bequests. In contrast, if we assume that every household starts
its working life with the smallest endowment of efficiency labor units,
then household earnings will grow significantly with household age.
Since the value that we target for the life cycle earnings ratio, which is
1.30, lies between these two extremes, we need a second additional
parameter, which we denote to act as a weight that averages betweenf ,2
and a matrix with a unit vector in its first column and zeros elsewhere.∗GRE
Intuitively, the role played by this second parameter is to shift the prob-
ability mass of toward its first column.∗GRE
Unfortunately, the effects of parameters and on the two statisticsf f1 2
that interest us work in different directions. Our starting point for sub-
matrix is Then, while parameter attempts to displace the∗G G . fRE RE 1
probability mass from the extremes of toward its diagonal, parameter∗GRE
attempts to displace the mass toward its first column.14 Consequently,f2
this very parsimonious modeling strategy might not be flexible enough
to allow us to attain every desired pair of values for our targeted
statistics.15
All these assumptions imply that, of the parameters needed2(2J )  J
in principle to determine the process on s, we are left with only 2J 
parameters. To keep the process on s as parsimonious as possible,J 4
we choose This choice implies that, to specify the process on s,Jp 4.
we must choose the values of 24 parameters.16
3. Technology
In the United States after World War II, the real wage increased at an
approximately constant rate—at least until 1973—and factor income
shares have displayed no trend. To account for these two properties, we
choose a standard Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function in cap-
ital and in efficiency labor units. Therefore, to specify the aggregate
technology, we must choose the values of two parameters: the capital
share of income, v, and the depreciation rate of capital, d.
14 See Sec. A in the Appendix for the formula that we use to compute fromG f ,RE 1
and ∗f , g .2 E
15 We discuss this property of our model economy in the first paragraph of Sec. V and
in the fourth paragraph of Sec. VA below.
16 Note that, when counting the number of parameters that characterize the joint age
and employment process, we have not yet required to be a Markov matrix.GSS
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4. Government Policy
To describe the government policy in our model economies, we must
choose the income and estate tax functions and the values of govern-
ment consumption, G, of the transfers to the retirees, q(s).
Income taxes.—Our choice for the model economy’s income tax func-
tion is
a 1/a1 1t(y)p a [y (y  a ) ] a y. (17)0 2 3
The reasons that justify this choice are as follows: (i) the first term of
expression (17) is the function chosen by Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
to characterize the 1989 U.S. effective household income taxes; and (ii)
we add a linear term to this function because the U.S. governmenta y3
obtains tax revenues from property, consumption, and excise taxes, and
in our model economy we abstract from these tax sources.17 Therefore,
to specify the model economy income tax function, we must choose the
values of four parameters.
Estate taxes.—Our choice for the model economy’s estate tax function
is
0 for z ≤ z
t (z)p (18)E {t (z z) for z 1 z.E
The rationale for this choice is that the current U.S. estate tax code
establishes a tax-exempt level and a progressive marginal tax rate there-
after. However, because of the many legal loopholes, the effective mar-
ginal tax rates faced by U.S. households have been estimated to be
significantly lower than the nominal tax rates (see, e.g., Aaron and
Munnell 1992). Consequently, we consider that the importance of the
progressivity of U.S. effective estate taxes is of second order, and we
approximate the U.S. effective estate taxes with a tax function that spec-
ifies a tax-exempt level, and a single marginal tax rate, Thesez, t .E
choices imply that, to specify the model economy estate tax function,
we must choose the values of two parameters.
5. Adding Up
Our modeling choices and our calibration strategy imply that we must
choose the values of a total of 39 parameters to compute the equilibrium
of our model economy. Of these 39 parameters, five describe household
preferences, two describe the aggregate technology, eight describe the
17 Note that this choice implies that, in our model economies, we are effectively assuming
that all sources of tax revenues are proportional to income. This assumption is equivalent
to assuming that our model economy’s government uses a proportional income tax to
collect all the non–income tax revenues levied by the U.S. government.
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government policy, and the remaining 24 parameters describe the joint
age and endowment process.
B. Targets
To determine the values of the 39 model economy parameters described
above, we do the following: we target a set of U.S. economy statistics
and ratios that our model economy should mimic; in one case—that of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for consumption—we choose
an off-the-shelf, ready-to-use value; and we impose five normalization
conditions. In the subsections below we describe our calibration targets
and normalization conditions.
1. Model Period
Time aggregation matters for the cross-sectional distribution of flow
variables, such as earnings. Short model periods imply high wealth to
income ratios and are therefore computationally costly. Hence, com-
putational considerations lead us to prefer long model periods. Since
our main data source is the 1992 SCF and since the longest model
period that is consistent with the data collection procedures used in
that data set is one year, the duration of each time period in our model
economy is also one year.
2. Macroeconomic Aggregates
We want our model economy’s macroeconomic aggregates to mimic the
macroeconomic aggregates of the U.S. economy. Therefore, we target
a capital to output ratio, of 3.13; a capital income share of 0.376;K/Y,
an investment to output ratio, of 18.6 percent; a government ex-I/Y,
penditures to output ratio, of 20.2 percent; and a transfers toG/Y,
output ratio, of 4.9 percent.Tr/Y,
The rationale for these choices is as follows: According to the 1992
SCF, average household wealth was $184,000. According to the 1998
Economic Report of the President, U.S. gross domestic product per house-
hold was $58,916 in 1992.18 Dividing these two numbers, we obtain 3.13,
which is our target value for the capital-output ratio. The capital income
share is the value that obtains when we use the methods described in
Cooley and Prescott (1995) excluding the public sector from the com-
putations.19 The values for the remaining ratios are obtained using data
18 This number was obtained using the U.S. population quoted for 1992 in table B-31
of the 1998 Economic Report of the President and an average 1992 SCF household size of 2.41
as reported in Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (1997).
19 See Castan˜eda et al. (1998a) for details about this number.
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for 1992 from the 1998 Economic Report of the President. The value for
investment is calculated as the sum of gross private domestic investment,
change in business inventories, and 75 percent of the private con-
sumption expenditures in consumer durables. This definition of in-
vestment is approximately consistent with the 1992 SCF definition of
household wealth, which includes the value of vehicles but does not
include the values of other consumer durables. The value for govern-
ment expenditures is the figure quoted for government consumption
expenditures and government gross investment. Finally, the value for
transfers is the share of GDP accounted for by Medicare and two-thirds
of Social Security transfers. We make these choices because we are in-
terested in only the components of transfers that are lump-sum, and
Social Security transfers in the United States are mildly progressive.
These choices give us a total of five targets.
3. Allocation of Time and Consumption
First, for the endowment of disposable time, we target a value of p
The rationale for this choice is that this value makes the aggregate3.2.
labor input approximately equal to one. Given this choice, we target
the share of disposable time allocated to working in the market to be
30 percent.20 Next, we choose a value of for the curvature ofj p 1.51
consumption. This value falls within the range (one to three) that is
standard in the literature. Finally, we want our model economy to mimic
the cross-sectional variability of U.S. consumption and hours. To this
purpose, we target a value of 3.0 for the ratio of the cross-sectional
coefficients of variation of these two variables. These choices give us
four additional targets.
4. The Age Structure of the Population
We want our model economy to mimic some features of the age structure
of the U.S. population. Since in our model economy there are only
working-age and retired households, and since the model economy
households age stochastically, we target the expected durations of their
working lives and retirements to be 45 and 18 years, respectively. These
choices give us two additional targets.
5. The Life Cycle Profile of Earnings
We want our model economy to mimic a stylized characterization of the
life cycle profile of U.S. earnings. As we have already mentioned, to
20 See, e.g., Juster and Stafford (1991) for details about this number.
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measure this profile, we use the ratio of the average earnings of house-
holds between ages 60 and 41 to that of households between ages 40
and 21. According to the PSID, in the 1972–91 period, the average value
of this statistic was 1.303. This choice gives us one additional target.
6. The Intergenerational Transmission of Earnings Ability
We want our model economy to mimic the intergenerational transmis-
sion of earnings ability in the U.S. economy. As we have already men-
tioned, to measure this feature we use the cross-sectional correlation
between the average lifetime earnings of one generation of households
and the average lifetime earnings of their immediate descendants. Solon
(1992) and Zimmerman (1992) have measured this statistic for fathers
and sons in the U.S. economy, and they have found it to be approxi-
mately 0.4. This choice gives us one additional target.
7. Income Taxation
We want our model economy’s income tax function to mimic the pro-
gressivity of U.S. effective income taxes as measured by Gouveia and
Strauss (1994). Therefore, we choose our model economy’s income tax
function from the family of functions described by expression (17). To
identify our function, we must choose the values of parameters a0, a1,
a2, and a3. Since a0 and a1 are unit-independent, we use the values
reported by Gouveia and Strauss for these parameters, namely, a p0
and The two additional targets result (i) from im-0.258 a p 0.768.1
posing that the shape of the model economy tax function coincides
with the shape of the function estimated by Gouveia and Strauss, in
spite of the change in units; and (ii) from assuming that all revenues
levied from sources other than the federal income tax are proportional
to income. Notice that these two targets are uniquely determined by
our choices for parameters a2 and a3. Specifically, the first one of these
targets is achieved by choosing the value of a2 so that the tax rate levied
on average household income in our benchmark model economy is the
same as the effective tax rate on average household income in the U.S.
economy; and the second target is achieved by choosing the value of
a3 so that the government in our model economy balances its budget,
that is, by choosing a3 so that the steady-state values of government
spending, G, aggregate transfers, Tr, and total tax revenues, T, satisfy
the condition described in expression (13). These choices give us four
additional targets.
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8. Estate Taxation
We want our model economy to mimic the tax-exempt level specified
in the U.S. estate tax code, which was $600,000 during the 1987–97
period. Since U.S. average income per household, was approximatelyy¯,
$60,000 during that period, our target for the value of estates that are
tax-exempt in our model economy is We also want our model¯zp 10y.
economy’s estate taxes to mimic the revenue levied in the United States
through estate taxation. During the 1985–97 period, this revenue was
only 0.2 percent of GDP (see, e.g., Aaron and Munnell 1992). These
choices give us two additional targets.
9. Normalization
We have one degree of freedom to determine the units in which labor
is measured. This allows us to normalize the endowment of efficiency
labor units of the least productive households to be More-e(1)p 1.0.
over, since matrix is a Markov matrix, its rows must add up to one.GSS
This property imposes four additional normalization conditions on the
rows of 21 Therefore, normalization provides us with five additionalG .EE
targets.
10. The Distributions of Earnings and Wealth
The conditions that we have described so far specify a total of 24 targets.
Since to solve our model economy we have to determine the values of
39 parameters, we need 15 additional targets. Given our calibration
strategy, these 15 targets, in principle, would be the Gini indexes and
13 additional points from the Lorenz curves of U.S. earnings and wealth
reported in table 2. However, there are some additional restrictions that
our parameter choices have to satisfy and that we have yet to discuss.
These restrictions arise from imposing that matrix must be a MarkovGSS
matrix and, hence, that all its elements must be nonnegative.
To do this, we equated to zero the transition probabilities that the
nonlinear equation solver attempted to make negative. In our final
calibration of the benchmark model economy, it turned out that only
one of the transition probability parameters of the submatrix wasGEE
equated to zero (see table 4 below). This gave us one additional target,
and consequently, it reduced the number of target points of the Lorenz
curves from 13 to 12. Note that the number of points that we target is
about three-quarters of the number of points that we report in tables
21 Note that our assumptions about the structure of the matrix imply that, once theGSS
submatrix has been appropriately normalized, every row of adds up to one withoutG GEE SS
our imposing any further restrictions.
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2, 7, 8, 11, and 14 below. In practice, instead of targeting 12 specific
points, we searched for a set of parameter values such that, overall, the
Lorenz curves of the model economies are as similar as possible to their
U.S. counterparts.
C. Choices
The values of some of the model economy parameters are obtained
directly because they are uniquely determined by one of our targets. In
this fashion, we make and 22 Similarly, the values ofj p 1.5 vp 0.376.1
the probability of retiring, and of the probability of dying,p , 1 p , e
are obtained directly from our targets for the durations of, respectively,
working life and retirement. The values for two of the parameters of
the income tax function, a0 and a1, were also taken directly from the
values estimated by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) for the U.S. economy.
Finally, our choice for the value of the endowment of time implies that
and the normalization of the endowment of efficiency laborp 3.2,
units implies that e(1)p 1.0.
The values of the remaining 31 parameters are determined solving
the system of nonlinear equations obtained from imposing that the
relevant statistics of the model economy should be equal to the cor-
responding targets and that the model economy should be in a steady-
state equilibrium. This last condition adds two additional unknowns and
two additional equations to our tally. The unknowns are the capital-
labor ratio and aggregate output, and the equations are the require-
ments that the values that the households take as given for these vari-
ables should be equal to the corresponding values implied by their
decisions.
Therefore, the calibration of this model economy amounts to solving
a system of 33 nonlinear equations in 33 unknowns.23 Unfortunately,
solutions for these systems are not guaranteed to exist, and when they
do exist, they are not guaranteed to be unique. Consequently, we tried
many different initial parameter values and sets of weights to find the
best calibration. We report the values of the 39 benchmark model econ-
omy parameters in tables 3 and 4 and in the first row of table 5 below,
and we discuss the results of our calibration exercise in Section VA
below.
22 Note that, given our choice for the aggregate production function, the value of the
capital income share is exactly v.
23 Actually we solved a smaller system of 26 equations and 26 unknowns because our
guess for the value of aggregate output uniquely determines the value of parameters a2
and because the value of G is determined residually from the government budgetz,
constraint, and because the normalization of the matrix allows us to determine theGEE
values of four of the transition probabilities directly.
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TABLE 4
Transition Probabilities of the Process on the Endowment of Efficiency Labor
Units for Working-Age Households That Remain at Working Age One Period
Later, (%)GEE
From s
To ′s
′s p 1 ′s p 2 ′s p 3 ′s p 4
sp 1 96.24 1.14 .39 .006
sp 2 3.07 94.33 .37 .000
sp 3 1.50 .43 95.82 .020
sp 4 10.66 .49 6.11 80.51
V. Findings
In this section we report our findings. We do this in two stages. In
subsection A, we report the behavior of our benchmark model economy,
which we have calibrated to the targets described in Section IV above.
As we have already mentioned, we find that the parsimonious way in
which we model the life cycle prevents our benchmark model economy
from matching the targeted values for the intergenerational earnings
correlation and for the life cycle earnings profile simultaneously. This
finding led us to carry out two additional computational exercises, which
we report in subsection B. The purpose of these exercises is to find out
whether or not our model economy can match each one of those two
targets separately. More specifically, in the first one of these exercises,
we match the intergenerational correlation of earnings observed in the
data in a model economy with a flat life cycle earnings profile, and in
the second exercise we match the life cycle earnings profile observed
in the data in a model economy in which earnings are uncorrelated
across generations.
A. The Benchmark Model Economy as a Theory of Inequality
In this subsection we report the calibration results, we discuss the reasons
that allow us to account for the U.S. earnings and wealth distributions
almost exactly, and we assess our benchmark model economy as a theory
of inequality.
The endowment of efficiency labor units process.—The procedure used to
calibrate our model economy identifies the stochastic process on the
endowment of efficiency labor units that determines its behavior. Since
this process is an essential feature of our theory, we start this subsection
with a description of it main properties.
Table 4 reports the transition probabilities on the endowments of
efficiency labor units of working-age households that remain of working
age one period later. Note that all rows sum up to .9778 (plus or minus
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TABLE 5
Relative Endowments of Efficiency Labor Units, and thee(s),
Stationary Distribution of Working-Age Households, ∗gE
sp 1 sp 2 sp 3 sp 4
e(s) 1.00 3.15 9.78 1,061.00
(%)∗gE 61.11 22.35 16.50 .0389
rounding errors) because the probability that a worker retires is .0222.
This table shows that the four shocks are persistent, and especially so
the first three. Specifically, the expected durations of each of the shocks
are 26.6, 17.6, 23.9, and 5.1 years, respectively. The table also shows that
a household whose current shock is is most likely to make asp 1
transition to shock than to any of the other shocks. Likewise,sp 2
households whose current shocks are either or are mostsp 2 sp 3
likely to move back to shock Only very rarely will householdssp 1.
whose current shock is either or make a transition to eithersp 1 sp 2
shock or shock and when a household draws shocksp 3 sp 4, sp
in any given period, it is most likely that it will draw shock very4 sp 1
soon afterward.
Table 5 reports the relative endowments of efficiency labor units and
the invariant measures of each type of working-age households. This
table shows that a large majority of these households are of type sp
followed by types and It also shows that the invariant1, sp 2 sp 3.
mass of type households is approximately one out of every 2,600.sp 4
As far as their relative endowments of efficiency labor units are con-
cerned, the hourly wages of types and householdssp 2, sp 3, sp 4
are, approximately, three, 10, and 1,000 times larger than those of
households.sp 1
The persistence of this process and the large differences in the values
of its realizations imply that if we normalize the present lifetime earnings
of the type households to be one, the present values of the lifetimesp 1
earnings of types and households are, approximately,sp 2, sp 3, sp 4
1.5, 4.3, and 120.1, respectively. Furthermore, these differences are per-
sistent across generations. Specifically, the expected lifetime earnings
of the descendants of retired households of each type are 1.0, 1.2, 2.6,
and 53.7, respectively. These findings suggest that a large fraction of
the differences in the economic performance of households may already
have occurred before their members enter the labor market.24 The ag-
gregate, distributional, and mobility implications of this process are
discussed below.
The age structure of the population.—Our specification of the joint age
24 See Keane and Wolpin (1997) for an empirical analysis of this issue.
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TABLE 6
Values of the Targeted Ratios and Aggregates in the United States and in the
Benchmark Model Economies
K/Y
(1)
I/Y
(2)
G/Y
(3)
Tr/Y
(4)
T /YE
(5)
h
(6)
CV /CVc l
(7)
e40/20
(8)
r(f, s)
(9)
Target (United
States) 3.13 18.6% 20.2% 4.9% .20% 30.0% 3.00 1.30 .40
Benchmark 3.06 18.1% 20.8% 4.4% .20% 31.2% 3.25 1.09 .25
Note.—Variable h (col. 6) denotes the average share of disposable time allocated to the market. The statistic
(col. 7) is the ratio of the coefficients of variation of consumption and of hours worked.CV /CVc l
and endowment process allows us to match the targeted expected du-
rations of the working life and retirement exactly. Hence, in every model
economy analyzed in this article, the expected duration of the working
life is 45 years, and the expected duration of retirement is 18 years.
The life cycle profile of earnings and the intergenerational transmission of
earnings ability.—As we have already mentioned, we find that our par-
simonious modeling of the life cycle does not allow us to match the
targeted values for the intergenerational correlation of earnings and
for the life cycle earnings profile simultaneously. Given this limitation,
we decided to go part of the way, and we chose as compromise values
1.10 for the age-dependent earnings ratio and .25 for the intergener-
ational correlation of earnings. These values are, approximately, one-
third and two-thirds of their U.S. economy counterparts. The rationale
for these choices is that we feel that the intergenerational transmission
of earnings is more closely related to inequality than the life cycle profile
of earnings. We find that our benchmark model economy comes very
close to matching those two compromise values (see cols. 8 and 9 of
table 6). In subsection B below, we shall carry out two robustness ex-
ercises that show that our model economy can account for each one of
these two features of the data separately. This establishes that our find-
ings do not depend crucially on the specific compromise choices for
these two targets.
Income taxes.—As we have already discussed in Section IVB7, once
parameter a2 of the tax function proposed by Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
has been appropriately normalized, the income tax function of the
model economy is identical to the effective income tax function esti-
mated by Gouveia and Strauss for the U.S. economy.
Estate taxes.—We report the estate tax revenue to income ratios in the
United States and in the benchmark model economies in column 8 of
table 6. We find that these ratios are very similar in both economies.
Macroeconomic aggregates and the allocation of time and consumption.—We
report the values of our aggregate targets for the United States and for
the benchmark model economies in columns 1–5 of table 6 and the
shares of hours worked and the ratios of the coefficients of variation of
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TABLE 7
Distributions of Earnings and of Wealth in the United States and in the
Benchmark Model Economies (%)
Economy Gini
Quintile
Top Groups
(Percentile)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
90th–
95th
95th–
99th
99th–
100th
A. Distributions of Earnings
United States .63 .40 3.19 12.49 23.33 61.39 12.38 16.37 14.76
Benchmark .63 .00 3.74 14.59 15.99 65.68 15.15 17.65 14.93
B. Distributions of Wealth
United States .78 .39 1.74 5.72 13.43 79.49 12.62 23.95 29.55
Benchmark .79 .21 1.21 1.93 14.68 81.97 16.97 18.21 29.85
consumption and hours in columns 6 and 7. We find that all these
statistics are very similar in both economies.
The distribution of earnings.—We report the Gini indexes and selected
points of the Lorenz curves of earnings in the United States and in the
benchmark model economies in panel A of table 7. We find that the
distributions of earnings are very similar in both economies. Moreover,
our benchmark model economy does a significantly better job of ac-
counting for the observed distribution of earnings than any of the pre-
vious attempts in the literature reported in table 1.
If we look at the fine print, we find that the main differences between
the model economy and the data are that the share earned by the fourth
quintile is smaller in the model economy than in the data and that this
is compensated by the shares earned by the other quantiles, which are
slightly larger in the model economy than in the data. During the course
of this research, we tried different parameterizations of our model econ-
omy increasing the accuracy of these statistics at the expense of the
accuracy of other calibration targets, and these changes made little
difference to our overall findings. Our results lead us to conjecture that
the differences between the Lorenz curves of earnings in the model
economy and in the data would have been smaller if we had chosen a
process on s of a higher dimension.
The distribution of wealth.—We report the Gini indexes and selected
points of the Lorenz curves of wealth in the United States and in the
benchmark model economies in panel B of table 7. We find that the
benchmark model economy accounts for the U.S. distribution of wealth
almost exactly and that it does a particularly good job of accounting for
the top 1 percent of the distribution. Again, we find that, overall, our
theory accounts for the observed wealth inequality in significantly
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TABLE 8
Distributions of Consumption in the United States and in the Benchmark
Model Economies (%)
Economy Gini
Quintile
Top Groups
(Percentile)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
90th–
95th
95th–
99th
99th–
100th
United States:
Nondurables .32 6.87 12.27 17.27 23.33 40.27 9.71 10.30 4.83
Nondurables* .30 7.19 12.96 17.80 23.77 38.28 9.43 9.69 3.77
Benchmark:
Wealthiest 1%
excluded .40 5.23 12.96 13.55 20.41 47.85 12.77 14.89 3.83
Entire sample .46 4.68 11.58 12.07 18.68 52.99 12.82 13.45 11.94
* Includes imputed services of consumer durables.
greater detail than any of the previous attempts in the literature reported
in table 1.
If we look at the fine print, we find that the main differences between
the model economy and the data are that the shares of wealth owned
by the fifth quintile and by the ninetieth to ninety-fifth quantile are
slightly higher in the model economy than in the data and that this is
compensated by the shares owned by the third quintile and by the ninety-
fifth to ninety-ninth quantile, which are slightly lower in the model
economy than in the data. We contend that the conjecture about the
dimension of s discussed above is valid also in this case. We conclude
that our choice of four realizations for the employment process is a
good compromise between the resulting number of degrees of freedom
and the accuracy in accounting for the U.S. earnings and wealth
distributions.
The distribution of consumption.—We report selected points from the
Lorenz curves of the distributions of consumption in the United States
and in the benchmark model economies in table 8. The U.S. data pertain
to 1991, and they were obtained using the sample weights of the Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey and the consumer price index deflators. The
first row of table 8 reports the U.S. distribution of nondurables, and
the second row reports the U.S. distribution of nondurables plus the
imputed services of consumer durables. A comparison of the numbers
reported in those two rows shows that the U.S. distributions of those
two measures of consumption are very similar.
The consumption share of output in our model economies is deter-
mined residually. Moreover, our target for the investment share includes
75 percent of private consumption expenditures in consumer durables.25
25 Recall that we made this choice to be consistent with the SCF definition of wealth,
which includes the value of vehicles but does not include the value of other consumer
durables.
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Therefore, the appropriate term of comparison for our benchmark
model economy statistics lies somewhere between the two measures of
consumption reported for the United States in table 8.
The third row of table 8 reports the distribution of consumption that
obtains when we exclude the wealthiest 1 percent of the model economy
households from the sample, and the last row reports the distribution
of consumption for the entire sample. The significant differences be-
tween these two distributions, and especially between their top tails,
illustrate the extreme sensitivity of the inequality statistics to the over-
sampling of the households in the top tails and to the amount of top-
coding.
A glance at the numbers reported in table 8 shows that consumption
is more unequally distributed in the model economy than in the U.S.
economy. It also shows that the shares of the lowest four quintiles re-
semble the data significantly more than those of the top quintile. More-
over, when we exclude the wealthiest 1 percent of the model economy
households from the sample, the shares consumed by the households
that belong to the top 1 percent of the distributions of consumption
in the United States and in the model economies are almost the same.
When a comparison is being made between the distributions of con-
sumption in the United States and in the benchmark model economies,
it is important to keep in mind that we have not used the distribution
of consumption as part of our calibration targets. Therefore, any sim-
ilarities between the model economy and the U.S. data along this di-
mension can be considered to be overidentifying restrictions of our
theory and further evidence of our success in accounting for the U.S.
earnings and wealth inequality.
Mobility.—People do not stay in the same earnings and wealth groups
forever. Consequently, a convincing theory of earnings and wealth in-
equality should account also for some of the features of the observed
earnings and wealth mobility of households. One way to summarize this
economic mobility is to compute the fractions of households that remain
in the same earnings and wealth quintiles after a certain period of time,
for instance, five years. We call these fractions the persistence statistics.
Note that in our calibration exercise we have not targeted any of these
statistics. Therefore, they are additional overidentifying restrictions of
our theory.
We report the persistence statistics for the earnings and wealth quin-
tiles of the United States and of the benchmark model economies in
table 9.26 We interpret our mobility results to be an additional success
26 The U.S. persistence statistics reported in table 9 are the same as those reported in
Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (1997). The source for their raw data was the PSID. The period
considered was the five years between 1984 and 1989. To construct the quintiles, they
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TABLE 9
Earnings and Wealth Persistence in the United States and in the Benchmark
Model Economies: Fractions of Households That Remain in the Same Quintile
after Five Years
Economy
Quintile
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
A. Earnings Persistence
United States .86 .41 .47 .46 .66
Benchmark .76 .55 .65 .80 .80
B. Wealth Persistence
United States .67 .47 .45 .50 .71
Benchmark .81 .80 .80 .75 .89
of our theory. The reason is that there is nothing in our theory that
would have made us predict that our model economy was going to match
any of these statistics. In particular, our parsimonious way of modeling
the life cycle makes it very difficult for our model economy to mimic
this feature of the data, especially if we take into account the large role
played by the life cycle in shaping economic mobility.27 This notwith-
standing, both our benchmark model economy and the data display
large earnings and wealth persistence, and both in our benchmark
model economy and in the data the top and the lowest quintiles tend
to be more persistent than the middle quintiles. We also find that, with
the exception of the first earnings quintile, both earnings and wealth
are more persistent in the benchmark model economy than in the U.S.
economy. This was to be expected from our parsimonious modeling of
the life cycle and from the already mentioned fact that much of the
mobility in the data is linked to the earnings and wealth life cycles.
Overall, we consider our mobility findings to be encouraging, and we
conjecture that versions of our model economy that include a more
detailed specification of the age-earnings profile of households will
mimic the U.S. persistence statistics significantly better.
An assessment.—We find that our benchmark model economy does an
extremely good job of accounting for the U.S. earnings and wealth
inequality and that it improves significantly previous results reported in
the literature. We think that our findings are particularly creditworthy
if we take into account our parsimonious model design and the many
computational difficulties solved in this research. We are convinced that
took into account only the households that belonged to both the 1984 and the 1989 PSID
samples.
27 For instance, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), Rı´os-Rull (1996), and others find that
the age-earnings profile of the households included in the PSID sample displays a clear
hump shape.
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a more sophisticated implementation of the age-earnings profile of
households would greatly enhance the ability of this class of model
economies to address the life cycle profile of earnings, the intergen-
erational transmission of earnings, and the economic mobility of house-
holds simultaneously. Those enhanced models should be able to capture
with enough detail the features of earnings and wealth inequality that
are due to the life cycle and those that are due to the exogenous idi-
osyncratic shocks that are the gist of this article. Finally, we are convinced
that this class of model economies will soon prove to be very useful to
evaluate the distributional implications of policy, and we very much look
forward to seeing the results of future research that quantifies these
implications.
B. Two Robustness Exercises
Our parsimonious modeling of the life cycle does not allow us to match
the intergenerational correlation of earnings and the ratio of the av-
erage earnings of households between ages 60 and 41 to that of house-
holds between ages 40 and 21 simultaneously. To find out whether or
not this is an important shortcoming of our model economy, we carry
out two robustness exercises. First, we attempt to mimic the observed
intergenerational correlation of earnings while allowing earnings to dis-
play no life cycle profile, and then we attempt to mimic the observed
life cycle earnings ratio while allowing earnings to display no intergen-
erational correlation. We find that the steady-state equilibrium alloca-
tions of these two model economies are very similar to those that obtain
in the benchmark model economy, even though the parameter values
that implement their calibrations differ somewhat. These findings lead
us to conclude that, in spite of being quantitatively significant, the roles
played by both the intergenerational transmission of earnings ability
and the life cycle profile of earnings are not the key to accounting for
the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality.
1. Accurate Intergenerational Transmission of Earnings Ability at
the Expense of the Life Cycle Profile of Earnings
In this model economy, the households draw their first working life
shock from four different conditional distributions in which the last
working life shocks of the predecessors in their dynasties are significantly
more likely than any of the other shocks. This feature allows us to match
our targeted intergenerational correlation of earnings exactly: the value
that we obtain for this statistic in this model economy is .40, which is
the value of this statistic reported for the U.S. economy. However, this
feature also implies that the distribution of the new entrants in this
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model economy is very similar to the distribution of senior working-age
households. Consequently, in this model economy, the earnings process
does not display any life cycle pattern, and the value that we obtain for
its age-dependent earnings ratio is 1.0.
We solve this model economy using the calibration procedure de-
scribed in Section IV above, and we report our findings in the rows
labeled match autocorrelation in tables 10, 11, and 12. The numbers
reported in those three tables show that the differences between the
match autocorrelation and the benchmark model economies are very
small.
2. Accurate Life Cycle Profile of Earnings at the Expense of the
Intergenerational Transmission of Earnings Ability
In this model economy, every household draws its first working life shock
from a distribution in which the low-productivity shocks are more likely
than the high-productivity shocks. Consequently, labor earnings tend to
improve with household age. This feature allows us to match the age-
dependent earnings ratio that we have chosen to measure the earnings
life cycle exactly: the value that we obtain for this statistic in this model
economy is 1.30, which is the value obtained from the PSID for the U.S.
economy. However, since in this model economy every household draws
its first working life shock from the same distribution, there is no in-
tergenerational transmission of earnings ability, and the value of its
intergenerational correlation of earnings is approximately zero.
We solve this model economy using the calibration procedure de-
scribed in Section IV above, and we report our findings in the rows
labeled match life cycle in tables 10, 11, and 12. Again, the numbers
reported in those three tables show that the differences between the
match life cycle and the benchmark model economies are very small.
VI. A Policy Experiment: Abolishing Estate Taxation
In this section we quantify the steady-state implications of abolishing
estate taxation. To this purpose, we study the aggregate, distributional,
and mobility properties of a model economy that has exactly the same
fundamentals as our benchmark economy, with the only exception that
estates are not taxed. More specifically, the joint age and endowment
of the efficiency labor units process, preferences, technology, the values
of government expenditures and transfers, and the progressive part of
the income tax functions are identical in both model economies. The
only difference between them is the proportional part of the income
tax functions, which we adjust in the model economy with no estate
taxes so that the government budget constraint is satisfied.
TABLE 10
Targeted Macroeconomic Ratios and Aggregates in the Model Economies
K/Y
(1)
I/Y
(2)
G/Y
(3)
Tr/Y
(4)
T /YE
(5)
h
(6)
CV /CVc l
(7)
e40/20
(8)
r(f, s)
(9)
Benchmark 3.06 18.1% 20.8% 4.4% .20% 31.2% 3.25 1.09 .25
Match autocorrelation 3.05 17.8% 20.4% 4.6% .20% 31.9% 3.12 1.00 .40
Match life cycle 3.07 18.1% 20.5% 4.6% .20% 31.8% 3.15 1.30 .03
Note.—See note to table 6.
TABLE 11
Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the Model Economies (%)
Economy Gini
Quintile
Top Groups
(Percentile)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
90th–
95th
95th–
99th
99th–
100th
A. Distributions of Earnings
Benchmark .63 .00 3.74 14.59 15.99 65.68 15.15 17.65 14.93
Match autocorrelation .63 .00 4.02 14.45 15.68 65.85 15.29 17.74 14.86
Match life cycle .62 .00 3.71 14.65 16.66 64.98 13.79 18.21 14.45
B. Distributions of Wealth
Benchmark .79 .21 1.21 1.93 14.68 81.97 16.97 18.21 29.85
Match autocorrelation .80 .18 1.12 1.64 14.25 82.80 17.38 18.63 30.00
Match life cycle .80 .18 .98 2.00 15.22 81.61 16.21 19.93 29.58
TABLE 12
Earnings and Wealth Persistence in the Model Economies: Fractions of
Households That Remain in the Same Quintile after Five Years
Economy
Quintile
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
A. Earnings Persistence
Benchmark .76 .55 .65 .80 .80
Match autocorrelation .76 .57 .65 .79 .81
Match life cycle .76 .57 .67 .82 .78
B. Wealth Persistence
Benchmark .81 .80 .80 .75 .89
Match autocorrelation .82 .80 .81 .78 .89
Match life cycle .80 .79 .78 .73 .89
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TABLE 13
Targeted Macroeconomic Ratios and Aggregates in the Model Economies
K/Y
(1)
I/Y
(2)
G/Y
(3)
Tr/Y
(4)
T /YE
(5)
h
(6)
CV /CVc l
(7)
e40/20
(8)
r(f, s)
(9)
Benchmark 3.06 18.1% 20.8% 4.4% .20% 31.2% 3.25 1.09 .25
No estate tax 3.08 18.2% 20.8% 4.4% .00% 31.2% 3.27 1.09 .25
Note.—See note to table 6.
TABLE 14
Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the Model Economies (%)
Economy Gini
Quintile Top Groups (Percentile)
First Second Third Fourth Fifth 90th–95th 95th–99th
99th–
100th
A. Distributions of Earnings
Benchmark .63 .00 3.74 14.59 15.99 65.68 15.15 17.65 14.93
No estate tax .60 .00 3.75 14.59 15.98 65.68 15.14 17.68 14.89
B. Distributions of Wealth
Benchmark .79 .21 1.21 1.93 14.68 81.97 16.97 18.21 29.85
No estate tax .80 .20 1.18 1.86 14.42 82.33 17.80 18.26 30.29
Once we have solved the benchmark model economy, computing the
solution to the model economy with no estate taxes amounts to solving
a much simpler system of three nonlinear equations in three unknowns:
the guesses for the capital-labor ratio and for aggregate output and the
proportional part of the income tax. We report the statistics of this model
economy in the rows labeled no estate tax in tables 13, 14, and 15.
We find that abolishing estate taxation brings about an increase in
the steady-state output of 0.35 percent and an increase in the steady-
state stock of capital of 0.87 percent. Along every other dimension, the
differences between the benchmark and the no estate tax model econ-
omies are negligible. If anything, we find that abolishing estate taxation
brings about a very small increase in wealth inequality. Specifically, the
Gini index of wealth increases from 0.79 to 0.80, and the share of total
wealth owned by the top quintile increases from 81.97 percent to 82.33
percent.
We conjecture that the main reason that justifies these findings is that,
given the demographics of our model economy, the role played by the
estate tax rate in determining the after-tax rate of return of the economy
is quantitatively very small. Moreover, the size of the effective marginal
estate tax rate chosen for our model economy during the calibration
process is also relatively small (17 percent), and, consequently, the
changes brought about by abolishing these small estate taxes are also
small.
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TABLE 15
Earnings and Wealth Persistence in the Model Economies: Fractions of
Households That Remain in the Same Quintile after Five Years
Economy
Quintile
First Second Third Fourth Fifth
A. Earnings Persistence
Benchmark .76 .55 .65 .80 .80
No estate tax .76 .55 .65 .80 .80
B. Wealth Persistence
Benchmark .81 .80 .80 .75 .89
No estate tax .81 .80 .80 .75 .89
VII. Concluding Comments
In this article, we provide a theory of earnings and wealth inequality,
based on the optimal choices of households with identical and standard
preferences, that accounts for the U.S. earnings and wealth inequality
almost exactly. We show that uninsured idiosyncratic earnings risk, re-
tirement, altruism, and government transfers to retired households are
essential ingredients of our theory since they allow us to replicate the
observed earnings to wealth ratios of both the rich and the poor house-
holds simultaneously. We also show that calibrating the earnings process
directly is a must if we want our model economies to replicate the
observed distributions of earnings and wealth in sufficient detail.
Our findings also indicate that we can account for the earnings and
wealth inequality observed in the United States without having to model
the poor and the rich as being different. Instead, the poor and the rich
can be thought of as being essentially the same type of people who have
been subject to a different set of circumstances.28 We are convinced that
these findings will have important implications for future research.
We consider this article to be a necessary first step in the formal
attempt to quantify the distributional implications of fiscal policy. The
study of the abolition of estate taxation reported in Section VI is only
a preview of this type of quantitative exercises. We intend to take the
next step in a companion paper, where we use the model economy
described here to quantify the trade-offs brought about by different
income tax policies.
28 Fleming (1955) makes the same conjecture, but he attributes it to an unknown source.
Specifically, he makes the following claim: “Somebody said that to become very rich you
have to be helped by a combination of remarkable circumstances and an unbroken run
of luck” (p. 60).
854 journal of political economy
Appendix
A. The Definition of Parameters andf f1 2
Let denote the transition probability from to let be the invariant∗p i R j E, gij i
measure of households that receive shock and let and be the twoi E, f f1 2
parameters whose roles are described in Section IVA2. Then the recursive pro-
cedure that we use to compute the is as follows.pij
Step 1.—First, we use parameter to displace the probability mass from af1
matrix with vector in every row toward its diagonal, as∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗g p (g , g , g , g )E 1 2 3 4
follows:
∗ ∗ 2 ∗ 3 ∗p p g f g f g f g ,51 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
∗ ∗ 2 ∗p p (1f )(g f g f g ),52 1 2 1 3 1 4
∗ ∗p p (1f )(g f g ),53 1 3 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,54 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,61 1 1
∗ ∗ ∗ 2 ∗p p f g  g f g f g ,62 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
∗ ∗p p (1f )(g f g ),63 1 3 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,64 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,71 1 1
∗ ∗p p (1f )(f g  g ),72 1 1 1 2
2 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗p p f g f g  g f g ,73 1 1 1 2 3 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,74 1 4
∗p p (1f )g ,81 1 1
∗ ∗p p (1f )(f g  g ),82 1 1 1 2
2 ∗ ∗ ∗p p (1f )(f g f g  g ),83 1 1 1 1 2 3
3 ∗ 2 ∗ ∗ ∗p p f g f g f g  g .84 1 1 1 2 1 3 4
Step 2.—Then for 6, 7, and 8, we use parameter to displace theip 5, f2
resulting probability mass toward the first column as follows:
2 3p p p f p f p f p ,i1 i1 2 i2 2 i3 2 i4
2p p (1f )(p f p f p ),i2 2 i2 2 i1 2 i4
p p (1f )(p f p ),i3 2 i3 2 i4
p p (1f )p .i4 2 i4
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B. Computation
As we have described in Section IV, to calibrate our model economies, we must
find the parameter values that imply that the steady-state conditions are satisfied
and that the steady-state statistics come close to matching our target values. This
amounts to solving a nonlinear system of 26 equations and 26 unknowns. To
solve this system, we use a standard nonlinear equation solver (specifically a
modification of Powell’s hybrid method, implemented in subroutine DNSQ from
the SLATEC package). The equations include the steady-state equilibrium con-
ditions for the capital-labor ratio and for aggregate output and the 24 equations
that specify the steady-state values of our 24 additional targets. The unknowns
include the guesses for the capital-labor ratio and for aggregate output and the
values of 24 of our model economies’ free parameters.29 To find a parameter-
ization that gives us acceptable differences between the values of the model
economies’ statistics and the calibration targets, we must evaluate the system of
equations a very large number of times. Moreover, each one of these evaluations
entails computing the equilibrium of our model economy for a given set of
parameter values. For each of these sets of parameter values, we use the following
procedure to compute the model statistics.
Step 1.—We compute the households’ decision rules. We do this using a piece-
wise linear approximation. The decision rule grid is very unequally spaced. The
distance between the grid points is very small near the origin, and it increases
rapidly as we move toward the upper bound of the set of asset holdings. The
reasons are that the curvature of the decision rules decreases very rapidly in
wealth and the range of asset holdings needed to achieve the observed wealth
concentration is fairly large: it is the interval (0, 3,400). In every iteration and
for every grid point, we solve the system formed by the two nonlinear Euler
equations. To increase the efficiency of the computations, we exploit the mono-
tonicity of the decision rules and their piecewise linearity. The inequality con-
straints that restrict the labor decision increase the complexity of this problem
(see Rı´os-Rull [1999] for details about the solutions of this class of problems).
Step 2.—Given the decision rules, we define and compute a Markov process
for the individual state {s, a} that satisfies the necessary conditions for the ex-
istence of a unique stationary distribution, (see Aiyagari [1994] or Huggett∗x
[1995] for details). We approximate this distribution with a piecewise lineari-
zation of its associated distribution function. The grid for this approximation
has 80,000 unequally spaced points that are very close to each other near the
origin (see Rı´os-Rull [1999] for details).
Step 3.—We compute the model economy’s distributional and aggregate sta-
tistics. This step requires the computation of integrals with respect to the sta-
tionary distribution, We evaluate these integrals directly using our approx-∗x .
imation to the distribution function for every statistic except for those that
measure mobility, the earnings life cycle, and the intergenerational correlation
of earnings. To compute these three sets of statistics, we use a representative
sample of 20,000 households drawn from (once again, see Rı´os-Rull [1999]∗x
for details).
29 We make a change of variables to ensure that the choices that the algorithm makes
of the transition probabilities are always positive and that the sign restrictions are satisfied.
See the discussion in Secs. IVB10 and IVC and in n. 23.
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